The human security dimension has been defined as a "freedom from want and freedom from fear", with the aim to identify the key security issues that the region is facing and to assess the EU foreign policies in parallel. This aim was also directed towards articulating the proposals for a more coherent and effective approach to the Western Balkans transition to a stable democracy. The assumption of this article rests on the fact that the spillover of the soft security issues into the hard security agenda of the Western Balkans has not been properly managed and it requires a revision of the current EU regional approach.
INTRODUCTION
T he post-conflict settlement in the Western Balkans 3 has been perceived as a significant challenge and threat to the security of the European Union (EU). It has also been recognized as an important test for the EU 1 Irina Žarin, The Directorate General for the EU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade. 2 The research results and opinion presented in this paper are in no relation with the official position of the institution where the author is employed. 3 Political formula for determining the geo-political position of the former SFRY Republics "minus Slovenia, plus Albania", which counts now 5 countries (Albania, Bosnia and the region have been presented in a policy paper prepared by the Finnish Presidency in May 2006. This document has examined the status of the human security, as only one of several dimensions of the EU regional approach. Since human security was defined as "freedom from want and freedom from fear", the main aim of this dimension was to identify key security issues that face the region and in parallel assess the EU Enlargement policy, ESDP and CFSP which brings new proposals for a more coherent and effective approach to the Western Balkans transition to a stable democracy. The conclusions of the document rest on the fact that the spill over of soft security issues into the hard security agenda of the Western Balkans has not been properly managed and it requires a revision of the approach. 9 Bearing in mind the fact that all Western Balkan countries have a reconfirmed European perspective and have been acknowledged as potential candidates for an EU membership, the purpose of this research is to show that the EU had no intention of importing security problems that could possibly trigger violence within its own realm. Unlike some scholars who argue that political and economic interests dominated the enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, the author intends to prove that a solution to the issue of the human security dimension was, actually, the main motivator for furthering the enlargement of the EU to the South-East of Europe.
FROM PEACE TO STABILITY: 1997-2000
The deliverance of peace to the region of Western Balkans hasn't brought immediate reestablishment of stability. The EU was strategically interested in introducing stability, since the fragility of the situation in the region carried certain aspects of security challenges and threats. These security risks became more serious, since the proximity of the war torn societies was slowly being diminished by the ignition of the preparatory process for the fifth wave of enlargement. Therefore, the EU has acknowledged the fact that proximity concerns could be alleviated to the benefit of the region by including it into the wider understanding of the EU foreign policy. The motives behind this approach were of a pure security nature, while its human dimension was the principal target. This approach, to be later on addressed as the "regional approach" towards the Western Balkans "…should try to contribute to reducing the tensions arising from the conflict and preventing a resumption of hostilities, promote a better understanding that is in the interest of each party to co-operate rather than to try to systematically put obstacles in the way of any undertaking by a neighbor, contribute to restoring confidence and dialogue and overcome ethnic divisions and hatreds." 10 
The Human Dimension of Security
According to the definition of the UN High Commissioner for refugees, the human security dimension encompasses 9 elements: respect of human rights, rule of law, physical security, poverty, unemployment, secularization, education, human trafficking and terrorism. All these elements are equally important for understanding the significance of human security within the EU regional approach towards the Western Balkans. Bearing in mind, the limited scope of this research, the author has decided to elaborate only on two of these elements, namely the respect of human rights and physical survival. This choice is based on the assumption that the basics of human security is captured in the notion of physical security (survival) and respect for human rights while they also present the founding layer for the remaining elements. Therefore, these two elements should not be considered as synonyms to the term of "human security" in general, but rather the very essence of it.
With respect to the position of the human rights issue and its framing security structures, the EU has formulated a specific foreign policy approach. In the center of this approach is the level of individual security, which also presents a foreign policy goal. The foreign policy goal of human security is perceived as a precondition in achieving other objectives such as sustainable economic development, stable and sustainable military and territorial security. 11 Therefore, the human security dimension is central to EU foreign policy, especially to its different segments such as the Enlargement policy and ESDP. 12 It is a focal point for the case of re-establishing lasting peace and security in the Western Balkans region because "the question of refugees and displaced persons is a key factor in the gradual consolidation of peace in the region" 13 and "they give new impetus to a policy of good neighbourliness based on the negotiated settlement of disputes, respect for the rights of minorities, respect for international obligations, including with regard to the ICTY, a lasting resolution of the problem of refugees and displaced persons and respect for States' international borders." 14 The EU active role in securitising the Western Balkans and bringing the human security dimension to wider public attention would not have been possible, unless the issue as such was externalised and internationalised. "In times of national or global crisis old power structures are cracked open and fundamental questions about the identity and purpose of social systems is more likely to be contested." 15 As previously mentioned, externalisation and internalisation of the human rights norm in the Western Balkans have already begun in the early 1990s, when the EU involvement in the process became visible. However, in order to have its actions legitimised in securitising the human dimension, the EU needed a voluntary or at least semi-voluntary engagement of the Western Balkans in the matter. By engaging the region in the all encompassing process of European integration with a possible outlook to membership, the EU used the proximity factor to the benefits of the region. In this way the EU gave the region the opportunity to co-operate in securing the human dimension by raising its willingness to participate in a "distinct and significant subsystem of security relations…" 16 
The Stabilization and Association Process
The EU formulated the status of the norm by expressing its concern about the potential security risk it carries and used the soft power means of persuasion to make the Western Balkan countries to embrace it as such. The result of this attempt has been materialized in the framework of the SAp which resonates a broader public understanding and is adopted as a new way 13 of talking about and understanding issues. 17 The SAp has been regarded as an improved and modified version of the previous "regional approach" and it is oriented as a foreign policy objective towards the Western Balkans. The EU has firstly considered the regional approach as an Europeanisation instrument, which presents an "ambitious strategy that helps the region to secure political and economic stabilization and to develop a closer association to the EU, opening a road towards EU membership once the relevant conditions have been met". 18 The SAp encompasses the Copenhagen criteria (1993) 19 accompanied by a set of new conditions (1997) 20 and it presents EU first attempt in institutionalising relations with the region. Although the human rights norm is situated in the group of Copenhagen political criteria, several other characteristics have been introduced in the additional set of criteria, known as the European standards, such as the co-operation with the ICTY and regional co-operation. This criterion has been inserted into the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), which were considered as a closure of the SAp. They are the final stage in evaluating the partner country's preparedness in gradually adopting and implementing the EU system of values and standards so that it fully complies with the given rules and conditions. The significance of the SAA lies in the fact that it would launch a new phase in the relation with the EU which would bring the perspective of EU membership even closer. However, not all states have demonstrated their full compliance with the EU position on the human rights norms. The EU was mainly relying on the political elites in the process, expecting them to be the engine of the human 17 Although the difference in their starting positions has been taken into account, the EU did not expect for the Western Balkan countries to differentiate drastically within the process. At this point, certain countries of the region started to question their logic of following the integration rules and conditions imposed by the EU, as well as their notion of the human security dimension. Up to this point, the Western Balkan countries have acted irrationally, by following the EU given rules and conditions without questions asked. This "logic of appropriateness" was abandoned as soon as the criterion on co-operation with the ICTY was introduced. This criterion was supposed to be fulfilled only by Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU did make several attempts in persuading the countries to fulfil this criterion, so that it is in their best interest to "behave appropriately" and" learn" how to deal with the problem. However, the countries felt that their boundaries of commitment to the process have been in this way openly tested by the EU. For Serbia, i.e. the demands made by the ICTY main prosecutor Carla del Ponte on submitting specific documents from the archives of national and military courts in relation to certain indicates has severely damaged the line of cooperation. It also presented a direct clash between the EU authority and interference in the national jurisdiction of the state organs. This test has posited the countries in a situation in which the EU expected from them to choose the most appropriate or the most legitimate course of action. Therefore, the EU attempt in high reaching externalisation of the human security issue raised concerns of these countries to the point of questioning the legitimacy of the European integration process and the actual gains for the region.
Another angle to the problem shows that the SAp is based on conditionality so that the Western Balkans countries have expected to be rewarded each time when they comply with a certain EU rule. If they do not comply, the process would be taken to a halt and the EU credibility as the driving force of the process of integration would have been endangered. The plausibility of failure gives space for bargaining, as rational behaviour, where the EU and Western Balkan countries are "strategic utility-maximisers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare." 21 If they do comply, the question of "the size of domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors determine whether the Western Balkan countries will accept or reject the conditions." 22 Since all actors are striving to positive adoption costs which would be beneficial in general, possible appearance of veto players could endanger the process. Apart from the government which adopts and implements EU rules, veto players present an important segment of the same authority or are a part of the society. They are the necessary element for introducing the change in the status quo. In the above mentioned example of Serbia's co-operation with the ICTY, the veto players were visualized as certain political parties, part of the state's bureaucracy and a wider layer of the society. Rational behavior of these actors explains the further inapplicability of the logic of appropriateness in complying with the EU rules and conditions in socializing the human rights norm.
The Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe
The EU foreign policy objective towards the Western Balkan was of a twofold nature. The SAp presented a bilateral framework, while multilateral relations with the regional countries and among themselves were conceived in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. According to Keukeleire, both type of relations were generating from the inter-state/society and global level and followed the procedure of internalising the human security dimension. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP SEE) 23 was to "identify areas where it provides added value as a catalyst and coordination mechanism"; while the issue of human security has been dispersed through its three working tables. 24 A significant aspect of the SP SEE involvement in the process of stabilizing and associating the region with the EU lies in the fact that it was very attentive to the efforts made by other nonstate actor in particular, "NGOs of the region are a major vehicle for the promotion of grass roots efforts". 25 By introducing new players in the game, the EU has created a new foreign policy based on experiences and lessons from EU participation in worldwide international crisis management. Therefore, the SP SEE represents the first CFSP tool in accomplishing an EU foreign policy goal towards the Western Balkans. The creators of the SP SEE have realized that establishment of a secure environment is a precondition for a successful post-conflict management and that progress in this sector is necessary for sustainable peace and democracy.
Although it has been placed under the umbrella of the competences of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU can be considered as the main utilizor of the SP SEE activities. The SP SEE aimed at developing co-operation between the countries which later on shaped their interaction according to the EU preferences. Furthermore, its structure was a test for the region in demonstrating political will and preparedness to cooperate on the issue of human security. "Opportunity and willingness is a form of agent-structure model, initially created to deal with the ways in which 'entities' are related to their environments… This individual adaptation produces the patterns of interaction that characterize the system". 26 The willingness and given opportunity were also seen as indicators to which extent the region would be able to adjust itself to the EU system. Furthermore, the EU envisaged the possible political spill-over effect that would project positive examples of co-operation in the domain of human security from the level of agency or regional level (SP SEE) to the bilateral level or level of intra-unit (Western Balkan states) relations. In theoretical terms, the SP SEE was invented to push and foster the Western Balkan adaptation and transition 24 Regional towards democratic, stable and prosperous societies. It was a "reality check" for the EU in terms of the feasibility of the European integration process. The envisaged societies were to be a role model for the region and if they were to succeed in achieving the goals set forth by the SAp and gradually accomplished through SP SEE, the region would prove that it was mature enough to be accepted by the European community as a partner. Therefore, the SP SEE could present a basic lessons-drawing model, where the Western Balkan countries are practicing and experiencing a mild impact of complying with the EU rules in an indirect way. The countries are supposed to search for rules abroad and this is made possible by the variety of individual member states of the SP SEE, some of which are either EU member states or acceding countries to the EU. Their direct interaction through the SP SEE structures makes it possible to get acquainted with the rules and methods for their application. This condition is closely linked with the actual search for rules embedded in different successful political systems. Finally, transferring EU rules through SP SEE channels in a modified way is a small exercise for evaluating if the EU rules are suitable for domestic use. Namely, it may be so that certain laws on implementing human rights are legitimate but the countries are faced either with lack of institutions or human capacity in order to make it functional. This situation requires "over-bridging" tools, so that time and finances would be spared and expected goals are achieved. Bottom line in comparing these two approaches lies in the distinction of the level of cooperation which indicates that human security, as a common problem among the regional countries, can only be solved if they firstly, identify common problems; secondly, define the causes of these problems and thirdly, operationalise methods for their elimination. The aim is to bring the countries to solve common issues by joint effort, which would create a fresh start for bilateral/regional relations and co-operation and these are the building block for enhancing co-operation in securing the human dimension within the SAp. However, the EU regional approach could be understood as hegemonic behaviour. 27 The guiding assumption is that preserving security in its direct neighbourhood was a long term strategic interest of the EU. In doing so, it would impose its model of European integration as a sound example of how political and economic affairs ought to be conducted in the Western Balkans. "The dominant logic underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions." 28 The EU conditionality is presented as the "conditionality policy" introduced in EC Conclusions in 1997. The bargaining strategy, as previously mentioned, understands that "actors are assumed to be strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare. In a bargaining process, they exchange information, threats and promises; its outcome depends on their relative bargaining power." 29 The logic of conditionality is based on the "carrot & stick" game, while external incentives consist of two types, namely the hard and soft incentives. Finally, the reward section understands assistance, institutionalisation of relations through different type of co-operation agreements to full membership. "EU conditionality mainly follows a strategy of reinforcement by reward…the EU pays the reward if the target government complies with the conditions and withholds the reward if it fails to comply." 30 The principal aim of EU conditionality is to restore the balance of power previously interrupted by the escalating human dimension of security risks. This power play would be submitted to EU own power status, since it is the one of a status quo, where nothing challenges its position as a hegemon. In this way, one might understand that the human dimension has been securitised due to state failure in all countries of the region, which initiated EU engagement in restoring stability and peace by securing primarily respect of human rights.
FROM STABILITY TO SECURITY: 2000-2003
As the year 2000 brought democratic changes 31 of a historical significance to the region, it also opened different ways for regional reconciliation and co- Balkan-EU political dialogue, aiming at the preparatory meetings for the conclusion of the accession agreement. However, this had not happened and the countries were, again, only recognized as potential candidates with a much stronger European perspective. The added value to the SAp was manifested in a new set of elements, such as priorities contained in the European Partnership document, designed to enrich and strengthen the process.
The 2000 Vacuum
By the end of the year 2000, the check & balance on the SAp at that point gave a rather gray picture of the region: Albania had received a positive feasibility study but the EU has decided to step up its co-operation and to spell out the reforms to be carried out, while a high-level EU-Albania steering group was yet to be established; Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fulfilled the required conditions laid down in their "road map" so it was given a deadline until mid 2001 to finalize the issue; Croatia, after having democratic changes, was enabled to engage itself in negotiations on the SAA; Macedonia has initialised the SAA and the EU has asked the government to embark the within the EU system of values and norms as well as further the undertaking of required reforms in order to achieve this principal goal. necessary reforms in order to implement it fully; FRY has had its prospect on the SAA established after the occurrence of democratic changes, while the EU had started with preparations for the work of the FRY-EU Consultative Task Force (CTF) and the launch of the feasibility study; unfortunately the work of the CTF did not last for long. Due to the unresolved issue of co-operation with the ICTY, the SAp has been put to a halt for a year. The political dialogue between the EU and the FRY was resumed in mid 2002 under a different name but with the same substance better known as the Enhanced political dialogue. The stumbling block in having the SAp continuing swiftly and rapidly along its path was found in the still present human insecurity. Every country of the region presented in the same sense but in a different way an insecure environment: FRY had still fresh traces after the NATO intervention conducted in 1999 due to atrocities committed by the Miloševiae regime over the Albanian minority in Kosovo and Metohija; Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were still fresh in dealing with the issues of refugees and displaced persons after the civil war took place in the beginning of 1990s; Macedonia was rather fragile and indeterminate in dealing with the outbreaks of violence caused by members of Albanian minority in the western part of the state; while Albania was still closed for some far-stretching solutions for improving the status of all human rights dimensions in its society.
The EU has put significant effort in stimulating the Western Balkan countries through the socialization and institutionalisation phase of the human rights norm. 33 It has evoked certain documents such as the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms or the Charter of the fundamental rights of the Union that lay the foundations for securing the human dimension. However, although the EU had delivered assistance of different types, the countries were expected to perform decisiveness and maturity in the process. Unfortunately, the actual level of decisiveness and maturity was on a rather low level and it did not satisfy EU expectations. The region was still fragile in terms of holding responsibility for its decisions, a lot of unresolved issues were floating around, insufficient institution and human capability were dominating, as well as, an unchanged level of mental conscience. Apparently, the last problem was the most difficult one to resolve. How does one actually influence in order to change the state of mind of a nation, country or a region? If we consider the state of mind in general terms as a "mental structure", the successful internalisation of these structures will be facilitated the more these structures are viewed as legitimate rather than as a result of a cost-benefit calculation or as a result of force by external actors. 34 Furthermore, "the extent to which a structure is, or can be, internalised and becomes a part of the 'mental structure' is to a large extent depending on the method through which these structures are created…" 35 Therefore, the EU has been striving for a lasting and sustainable human security dimension in the Western Balkans.
In this effort, the EU has advocated strongly for the same methods other European countries used in order to harmonize themselves with the EU system of values and norms. The SAp started as such but very soon it had to be complemented with somewhat stronger and more bounding elements which were later encompassed in the European standards. These elements were supposed to restore the balance of power and allow peace and stability to be brought back in the region. Therefore, the direct neighbourhood of the EU would have been secure and every potential security risk avoided. The question that still remained was how the EU would secure the human dimension in the Western Balkans. The EU was considered the primary actor in the region when introducing the SAp with a perspective for an EU membership. However, the phases in-between that lead to membership were weakly devised, which was even shown by the annual Country Progress Reports. In order to make the SAp more effective the EU elaborated its approach and introduced another document called the European Partnership. The task of this document was to conduct the SAp in a more effective manner and to implement the EU recommendations regarding the same process in an efficient way.
The European Partnership document
The EU -Western Balkans Summit in Thessalonica 2003 has concluded that the current framework for European relations with the region, known as the SAp, will remain central but it will be enriched with elements drawn from the recent successful enlargement process. Among presented four elements, the strengthening of political co-operation was of a particular relevance since it had a sub-dimension dealing with human security. The European Partnership documents were introduced in a new form, offered to match individual needs of the Western Balkan countries.
The European Partnership documents for the year 2003 have dedicated a large amount of attention to the issue of human security in the region. Through this strategic brief, the EU Commission has involved the countries in question directly in the process of policy making. They were given the opportunity to supplement a decisive document with their own experiences and remarks. In order to achieve reforms envisaged by the document, each country was supposed to develop a National Action Plan (NAP). The NAP's were a set of proposed measures to be undertaken in order to gradually implement priorities that were contained in the European Partnership. The NAP's were not only a set of written obligations for the Western Balkan countries but also a proof of their rights as potential candidates. The most common issues to be worked on were mostly of an institutional nature. The countries were recommended to strengthen and improve the work of different governmental bodies in enforcing human rights. The effort was aiming towards institution but also human capacity building. These bodies were usually referred to as the judicial and police system, ombudsman, freedom of media, reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. 36 In its first operational year the document did not achieve much in furthering the SAp. One of the first critiques was pointing to its ungrateful role in "bureaucratising" the process of associating with the EU, which weakens in great deal the main purpose of the integration process. On the other hand, its result could not have been greater since most of the countries found the creation and implementation of their NAP's as a useless task. The general feeling was that more valuable time was spent in justifying what should be done and how to secure the human dimension unlike what was actually happening on the ground. This critique has been taken into account and it helped in improving the existing document already in the year 2004 during the publication of the annual Country Progress Reports. However, the logic was still the same. The EU stood firm with its prior decision to make the countries realize that they need to overtake a certain amount of responsibility and action in the SAp. Hence, the EU gave them the tool as well as the road map of how to make the measures on securing the human dimension functional.
In the same year when the European Partnership documents were published, the EU had presented its new European Security Strategy. The significance of this document was enormous since it dedicated a whole chapter to the position and observation of security in the Western Balkan region and elaborated on the future tasks of the EU in pursuing a secure environment in this part of its neighborhood with a specific emphasis on the human dimension. The document acknowledges the importance of the EU role in managing the post-conflict settlement in the region where "the European Union and the Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and put failed states back on their feet, including the Balkans…" 37 This conflict perceived to be of a regional nature, has reminded Europe that war has still not disappeared from the continent. The Western Balkan countries were for decades caught in a cycle of conflicts, insecurity and poverty. Since conflicts were undermining development in general terms, but mostly they were "destroying human lives, social and physical infrastructures, threatening minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights". 38 Therefore, regional co-operation was seen as the natural answer for establishing security which allows development to grow. The best possible solution for the region to prosper was to familiarize it with the rule of law, democracy which would change the then authoritarian regimes into stable, secure and prosperous democracies. However, these countries were still seen as a source of potential violence which makes Europe face security threats and challenges. One of the major implications of the fifth wave of enlargement was seen in bringing the EU closer to troubled areas. Therefore, this document shows that developing human security in the region had to be complementary with the general EU security framework. The relation between the two different levels of development in security terms between the Western Balkans and EU understands a certain interdependence and interrelatedness. The EU security framework has been perceived by the Western Balkans as a role model in achieving the required level of security development especially in terms of securing the human dimension. Therefore, certain amount of interdependence between actors and interrelatedness of the policy in securitizing the human dimension had to be developed within both security frameworks (EU and Western Balkans). Namely, the EU understands that the international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. This quality is being bred through the deliverance of the rule of law, democracy and respect of human rights, as previously mentioned. Therefore, the best protection for the EU security is a world of well-governed democratic states, not only within its borders but also in its neighbouring environment. Furthermore, "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order." 39 The European Partnership and European Security Strategy can be considered as the two most relevant documents for developing the EU approach towards securing the human dimension in the Western Balkans. They can be, also, categorized as a specific tool for achieving the EU foreign policy goal in the Western Balkans. Taking into consideration that the EU approach was structured so that it dealt with the issue in two-tracks (multilateral and bilateral) and simultaneously, the EU foreign policy objective lied in the responsibility to ensure a continuous development of the human security dimension in the Western Balkans. 40 This approach was of a proactive nature since it involved EU preventive action in disabling the potential causes which lead to the previous distortion of the position and role of the human rights norm in the region. In disabling the possible occurrence of human rights norm violation, the EU had the need to address the root causes of a potential distortion by improving, reinforcing and/or changing the underlying structures. The violation/distortion of a human rights norm is understood here as a potential cause of a conflict, which was the case in the hostilities during the 1990s. As previously mentioned, these structures were not only institutions such as governmental institutions but also mental structures, such as the level of development of a certain part of political culture. These actions required a certain amount of effort and time, as well as, a gradual and structural approach. Therefore, the whole body encompassing these actions and measures necessary to implement them is being referred to as a long-term conflict prevention strategy. The author believes that this strategy is a sub-dimension of the EU structural foreign policy and as such, it facilitates the main goal of internalising and socializing the human rights norm so that it helps in restoring human security in the region. 
The Regional Ownership
For developing a human security dimension in the region, which was perceived as the most probable cause for renewing conflicts between the countries, the EU approach had to be placed along three features of its structural foreign policy. These central features included "(1) the long-term perspective and the focus on sustainability (2) the interrelatedness of various structures (the political/legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures) and (3) the interrelatedness of various levels (individual, society, state level, relations between state and societies and global level)." 41 The best possible solution for realizing these features was in the establishment of an artificial environment which mimed to a certain extent the EU system of values and norms, namely the SP SEE framework. This framework supposed, for the purpose of the exercise, that human security of individuals was guaranteed. The only task, that the Western Balkan countries had to perform was sustaining the level of human security by improving the conditions under which it has been established and allow it to be further developed. These activities required the actual long-term policy approach by developing different sets of documents for its realization i.e. the NAP, interrelatedness of various structures based on institution building and interrelatedness of various levels based on human capital building. The actual possibility for the Western Balkan countries to try and create such an environment was given through the work of the three SP SEE Tables. As Noutcheva has noticed, "the risk of instability in the short run dictates further EU involvement. Yet, too much EU involvement beyond the initial phase of stabilization might work against the long-term objective of strengthening the state capacity of the countries from the region. If good governance is the solution to the Balkan problems, selfgovernance is the way to sustain good performance standards in the long run." And this was how the SP SEE framework has been acknowledged as a very good practice for the Western Balkan countries to start self-governing the issue of human security dimension.
The first attempts in self-governing the issue of human security dimension in the Western Balkans gave rather positive and unexpectedly successful results. These results maintained their success and proved to have a promising follow-up. The EU had recognized the achieved results in securing the human dimension in the Western Balkans and decided to promote the countries engagement in this respect by giving them an official recognition defined as the regional ownership.
Regional ownership understands a regionally owned co-operation framework in South Eastern Europe. 42 It goes beyond the initial regional cooperation within the SP SEE framework. It encompasses other regional initiatives such as the South East Co-operation Process (SEECP), which has been developed by the countries of the region as an added value to the efforts of the SP SEE. However, South Eastern Europe (SEE) in general hosts now more than a dozen regional initiatives which have a lot of common features. In order to avoid overlapping and duplication of work in all aspects, the countries have decided to phase out certain regional initiatives and give more space to other more successful ones. At this point, the Western Balkan countries as a part of participating SEE countries in regional initiatives have demonstrated rational choice behaviour. Their option to continue the more successful initiatives in achieving their common goals has complemented their overall contribution in securing the human dimension through regional co-operation.
Regional co-operation achieved through particular regional initiatives in securing the human dimension in the region has been a good exercise for the region and the EU to test the real capabilities of both actors in joining efforts to achieve a common goal. This test has also shown the gap between the existing capabilities and unrealistic expectations for both sides. 43 Since regional co-operation was one of the conditions laid down in the European standards, the option of accepting it as a tool to internalise the human security dimension was embedded in the overall European integration process. The EU has succeeded at this point of time in stimulating the impetus of change within the Western Balkan state and societal level. By accepting and promoting the security challenges and risks placed within the human dimension, the Western Balkan countries have internalized the human rights norm to a certain degree within the institutional and mental structures. However, considering the EU expectation in the regions potential/capabilities have been overestimated due to the lack of particular factors that are supposed to facilitate internalisation and socialization. Therefore, the gap was not only present between expectations and capabilities but also between the institutional and mental level where the human rights norm was supposed to be absorbed.
Within the SAp, regional integration has been presented as one of the most important European standards in order to maintain human security in the Western Balkans. However, reasons for establishing regional co-operation as well as its potential success in achieving this goal have been seriously questioned under the assumption that co-operation is very difficult to achieve and even harder to maintain. The constant feeling of fear and distrust shapes the relations between countries in such a way that if they do opt for co-operation, the main obstacles in pursuing it are found in cheating and relative gains. According to Grieco, "states are interested in increasing their power and influence (absolute gains) and, thus, will co-operate with other states or actors in the system to increase their capabilities." 44 The furthering of capabilities is tightly linked with the issue of survival, so that the Western Balkan countries firstly "survive" within the region itself and then within the EU system. The EU foreign policy determines regional co-operation as a prerequisite for not only survival but also enhancing mutual relations with and within the region. It is in the interest of both, the Western Balkans and EU, for the countries of the region to co-operate because it is the only way to avoid possible conflicts. However, Grieco also mentions that "states are also concerned with how much power and influence other states might achieve (relative gains) in any co-operative endeavour." 45 Even more, "the emphasis that states place on relative gains will limit the growth of institutions and will always make co-operation difficult." 46 As previously assumed, the EU is interested in dealing now with the human security dimension while the Western Balkan countries are still "outside" the European area. It has no intention in importing potential security challenges and/or risks. Therefore it decided to act in a defensive way by investing a certain amount of effort in managing and improving the human security dimension in the region. However, according to Jervis, neither the SAp, nor the SP SEE as institutions can be perceived as the most effective way for diminishing the security dilemma.
FROM SECURITY TO PROSPERITY: BEYOND 2003
After more than four years of extensive engagement in securing the human dimension in the Western Balkans, the EU recognized that the countries of the region needed a clear roadmap and association/accession strategy so that they can carry out the necessary reforms. As Noutcheva noticed, "getting them involved rather than staying involved should become the principle of the EU engagement in the region." 47 Therefore, the EU had decided to accelerate the finalization of the SAp and bring the whole region fast forward to EU membership. In order to do so, the EU had to pledge all its credibility so that the proposed strategy could gain necessary legitimacy. With regards to the human security dimension, the EU was mostly pushing for co-operation of the Western Balkans with the ICTY but also for complementing with the basic principles of human rights protection laid down in the international and regional conventions. As a reward it offered the acceleration of the SAp in certain aspects, some of them carrying mainly the human security dimension as their main focus (i.e. visa liberalization).
A Regional Security for the Western Balkans
The evolution of the human security dimension in the Western Balkans has been after the year 2003 caught in a so called globalisation spun. The world's rapid reaction to the protection of individuals and their human rights was triggered by the growing terrorist threats. It seemed that the terrorist attacks happening across the world, from New York via London and Madrid to Sharm El Sheikh were directed not only towards states and governments but also individuals. The consequences of these atrocities were unimaginable and following the globalisation effect they were affecting everyone and they were present everywhere.
The region of Western Balkans was not exempted from the political and security impact of these terrorist attacks. The issue of not having the human dimension elaborated well enough, has triggered a growing attention of the world to this region. The still fresh experiences of violence during the 1990s have imposed an opinion, that the region could still be a possible source and transit for security risks and challenges that could endanger the human dimension. Taking into account so far achieved results in securing the human dimension, the EU was particularly interested in preserving the established security by offering further incentives that would lead the countries to a prosperous life. The EU has acknowledged that the only way forward for the region is to have a strategy in place that would not only maintain but also enhance the development of the human security dimension. The embedding elements of this strategy were reviewed through the annual Country Progress Reports as well as the European Partnership (2006) documents. According to these documents, the evaluation of compliance with the standards of respect and protection of human rights showed that in Albania, human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by Albanian law and the government generally observes them. However, enforcement of international agreements on human rights in areas such as torture prevention, rights of detainees, and the right to a fair trial remains weak. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina have signed almost all required international document and conventions on respect and protection of human rights, the main problem still persists along the lines of complicated legislation system and lack of institution capability (i.e. torture and ill-treatment). Therefore, the major issue is with respect to the actual compliance with the EU standards. The screening of the human rights situation in Macedonia has shown that a limited progress had been made in the areas of children's rights, education, prevention of torture and ill-treatment and interethnic relations in general. With the adoption of the Constitution pending, Montenegro has already developed a set of legal acts on the protection of human rights. They are based on the Charter of the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and Charter on minority and human rights and civil freedoms. There still remains to be introduced an access to justice, improvement of the prison system, education of civil servants and senior managers and the question on the future status of internally displaced persons and refugees is still open. In Serbia, the question of the status of Kosovo still remains at large, and it is the biggest and most important issue when dealing with human security dimension. Significant improvements were made in the areas of freedom of expression (media), freedom of religion, women's rights, children's rights and socially vulnerable and disabled persons. However, the situation in Sand ak and Southern Serbia is still alarming. The main conclusions drawn from these documents still referred to regional co-operation as the main mechanism for achieving lasting security which would bring prosperity to the region. The strategic orientation of the EU in the period after 2003 was aiming at the establishment of a regional security framework that would enable the countries to reach the EU membership by fulfilling all previously set conditions. These conditions were considered to be the main guarantee for having the countries successfully integrated in the EU structure. "The human security approach precisely because of its emphasis away from hard security provides a window of opportunity for creating a collective security system for the Balkans." 48 The regional security framework is based on a Regional Security Strategy (RSS), which "aims to forge a consensus on key regional security issues. It serves to introduce and reinforce a new way of thinking about regional security, employing a comprehensive approach that examines security issues on a regional level." 49 The RSS is a result of a weak European integration prospect, not powerful enough as a force to transform the societies of the Western Balkans. Therefore, the RSS advocates for changes within the countries of the region. Although the RSS argues that the Western Balkan countries face a number of common threats which should be solved by the governments, the main interest of this strategy is viewed in the protection of individual security. Only a strong ring of individual security can increase regional security which is developed through a cooperative approach.
The idea of establishing security co-operation among individual states has been introduced by Koen as the co-operative security concept. "Co-operative security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberaldemocratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political and defense co-operation. In a Co-operative Security system, individual states' national security objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security: Ring one -individual security, Ring twocollective security, Ring three -collective defense and Ring four -promoting stability." 50 For the WB countries, the main importance was to establish the first ring which aimed at promoting and protecting human rights within their own boundaries and further a field. With the creation of the SP SEE, an incentive was delivered to the countries in the region to join efforts in tackling a common problem on human security. Koen believes that protection and improvement of basic human freedoms constitute a nucleus out of which all security dimensions should radiate. Therefore, he considers this system of cooperative security to be practically human-centric. 51 Similar to Koen's idea, Deutsch has introduced a model of co-operative community as a solution for establishing a lasting, stable and peaceful international co-operation. 52 Deutsch perceives, as the main interest of nations to associate in security communities, to overcome the thinking and acting within the pattern of the security dilemma. The new way of thinking and acting between states within such a community is not based on the traditional estimations of threats and capabilities or challenges and responses. The behaviour of states is being determined by progressive contribution for institutionalisation of co-operative relations. In the case of Western Balkan countries, institutionalised regional security co-operation has been from the very beginning the major activity of the Third Working Table of the SP SEE. This type of security communities, where states associate through the creation of common institutions has been named by Deutsch the amalgamated security community. 53 However, practice has shown that informal structures of any type in the Western Balkans did not give much of a result. For some reason, only tight and formal structures could give a substantial contribution to socialization and institutionalisation of the human rights dimension. At the beginning, the informal structures were targeting only the exchange of information on the governmental level. By focusing mainly on states, they have excluded a very relevant factor presented by the civil society. "Human security has to involve civil society. There is a need for a public vested interest in human security, it needs mobilization of public opinion." 54 The EU has recognized the insufficiency and lack of applicability of its top-down approach. 55 In their political dialogue with the political elites, the EU has unintentionally discriminated other relevant actors in the process of securitising the human dimension. "The international efforts in the region have been overwhelmingly concerned with top-down institutional building, based on a dialogue with political elites…. Possibilities must be opened for a fresh re-imagining of political leadership in the region, since current elites are enjoying only external legitimacy (from the West) rather than internal legitimacy from within each state based on what they have achieved in terms of public goods provisions." 56 Taking into account the initial aim of the RSS, civil societies have been viewed as one of the major push and pull forces. "Europeanisation as a goal guiding the region's efforts to overcome the legacy of violent conflicts should aim at providing and upholding human security and this requires innovations in EU policies." 57 The proposed bottom up innovations in the EU policies, especially the CFSP and ESDP, were supposed to deal with the overemphasizing role of regional co-operation in the Western Balkans. It raised concerns on both sides motivated by a growing uncertainty of the position that the countries have as potential candidates. The EU has been insisting upon the Western Balkan countries to comply fully with the conditions imposed without any timely visibility of the reward presented as the EU membership. This has coloured in a sceptical way the prospects of the European integration process as a whole. "The European perspective has been watered down, regional cooperation is, again, being perceived as a substitute for accession in the region, and crucial mediation efforts and decision making processes as regards status issues remain outside the Union." 58 The EU credibility as an international player has been at stake. In order for the EU to retain its credibility, the general opinion was that politicians should be able to use the enlargement talk 59 so that the local elites and the EU could deliver on their promises. Only in this way the region will be kept on track with the integration process and rewarded as promised.
The Euro-Atlantic Integration Entrapment
Keeping the region fast on track with the European integration process with an open prospect for EU membership was set as a priority immediately after the EC meeting in Salzburg by the beginning of 2006. High expectations were raised by the Western Balkan countries preliminary to the meeting considering their status as still being potential candidate countries. Except for Croatia, the remaining countries were asking for a push forward that would accelerate the finalization of the SAp. The EU was cornered by the demands made by the Western Balkan countries and engaged itself in devising an exit strategy. Although the idea of binding the European integration process with the association of the region with NATO was not new, the EU used the momentum to forge the external incentives formula. In order to strengthen its position as a credible international player and live up to its promises given to the region, the EU introduced a semi-obligatory criterion to the list of preaccession conditions defined as the "Euro-Atlantic integration process".
The underlying policy of the Euro-Atlantic integration process was the Partnership for Peace program (PfP). This program has been introduced already in 1994 and has been very active in strategically supporting the idea of integrating the Western Balkan into European structures. Due to the developments on the international agenda from 2000 onwards, which indirectly influenced EU and NATO's geo-political and geo-strategic orientations towards the region, the PfP was given a new role. The PfP was seen as an adequate replacement for the previous unsuccessful attempts to create security regime within the region. "Most of the work on security reform in the Western Balkans has taken place within the framework of the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program…. Against the region's particular concerns, there is a need to rethink the approach to security reform along two dimensions: internally, by greater involvement of civil society, and externally, by embracing regional dimension." 60 Furthermore, having the necessary institutional and financial means to deal with hard security issues, namely the human security dimension, it was seen as a natural supplement to the CFSP and ESDP. It was, also, offering the region a much tighter and secure connection to a successful security organization. This connection, transformed to an institutional co-operation, has locked the countries closer to the epicentre of all strategically important changes and developments. In a psychological sense, the Western Balkan countries felt that they again "belong" to Europe and Western civilization.
The PfP has been defined as program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO. Already in Art.2 of the Framework document significant priority has been given to several aspect of human security "this Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership." 61 In fulfilling their obligations set forth by this document, the partner countries are called upon to respect several international documents such as the UN Charter, Universal Declarations of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act. The partner countries are specifically advised to "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means." 62 The institutionalisation of co-operation between NATO and the Western Balkan countries has established the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) brings together NATO member states and partner countries for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues. The Western Balkan countries were given an opportunity not only to be a part of a security structure but also to participate and develop according to its standards. The importance of establishing this Council was two-fold: it is considered to be both, a soft and hard security incentive. In a political sense, it drew and locked the countries firmer to the foci of the European integration process by giving it an Atlantic aspect. In a technical sense, it gave a financial impetus to the reconstruction of the security mechanisms within every individual country of the region and allowed them to equally participate in the elaboration of the security aspect on human dimension. Here, both the EU and NATO recognized the importance of supporting regionally devised initiatives that would deal with the human security dimension. This approach is in line with the previously mentioned regional ownership and the RSS.
Concluding with the year of 2007, all Western Balkan countries have become signatory states to the PfP. This makes the process of Euro-Atlantic integration circled, but it also raised some doubts about its prospects. Previously, there were concerns about the intentions of using regional cooperation as a substitute for the European integration process. As the enlargement process took queue, EU leaders became aware of the growing enlargement fatigue and the problem of absorption capacity. Several critiques were aimed at the EU intention to divert the integration process once again, by shedding the light on the role of the PfP within the process itself. Since the PfP was designed to partly monitor and control the human security dimension in the region, if it evaluated that the situation on the ground was not satisfactory it could have easily given a negative recommendation for the completion of the SAp. The interconnectedness and interdependence between the SAp and the PfP were elaborated through time. As the momentum came, the EU pressed by its internal problems had to pull the breaks for a certain period of time regarding its external engagement. The easiest way to do it was to insist on matters that were politically not acceptable (i.e. co-operation of Serbia with the ICTY, Kosovo status) in order to gain time for internal consolidation.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the EU policy orientation as well as strategic preparedness in dealing with the human security dimension have shown that its approach was hindered by inadequate tools, presented as the soft security means to tackle a hard security issue. Since the expectations -capability gap has been detected in this respect, the EU has decided to improve the existing policy. The integration strategy was enriched with new elements which had policy attributes but still insisted on the fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria and European standards. Not only have they enriched the policy as such but they also allowed a new partnership to enter the scene. The so called Euro-Atlantic Partnership had the aim to facilitate the efforts in the process of internalising and institutionalising the human rights norm. Furthermore, this relation allowed the countries of the region to actively participate in the development and improvement of human security within each country and within the region as a whole. The emphasis in achieving envisaged results was detected in the necessity of a firm regional co-operation determination which was supposed to be based on a strong political will of the regions' leaders as well as support from their international partners by delivering technical and financial means. The EU decisiveness as well as invested time and effort have proven that the human security dimension was a key topic throughout the 1990s. The contribution of the region in this respect was given through the acknowledged regional ownership. The article concludes that the human security dimension still remains at large in some parts of the countries of the region. This is what makes it still a potential security risk for the EU external borders. Since the prospect of EU membership is becoming much clearer for the Western Balkan,
